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Abstract 
 
A smart grid system supports intelligent metering and monitoring functions spanning 
the areas of power generation, transmission and distribution. It has enormous benefits for 
meeting the energy demands and billing requirements through controls at the supply side 
rather than at the demand side. This departure from the traditional perspective makes it a very 
attractive transformation for both developing and developed economies. However, a major 
drawback is the increased vulnerability of the highly connected system and knock-on 
ramifications on various related sub systems and networks. With the connectivity emerge the 
associated dangers of exposed system entry points through nodes located at various 
geographical locations; making an easy target for a motivated hacker. Starting at the 
compromised node, the inner system can be penetrated and its core functionality can be 
compromised. There is thus a need for having a system wide resilience in the design and 
architecture to meet these challenges. This paper reviews the vulnerabilities and resilience 
strategies for a smart grid and proposes the combined use of macro and micro management 
techniques as an evolutionary process to enhance system availability. 
 
 
Index Terms: Computer Security, cyber security, Control systems, SCADA, critical 
infrastructures. 
 
Introduction 
Smart grid is the integration of digital technologies with power generation and transmission. It provides 
better control to consumers over their energy consumption, reduces expenses of the producers by 
matching supply to demand, and improves network visibility to infrastructure managers. It thus benefits 
the electricity consumers, local communities, environmental agenda and the country as a whole. 
Smart grid transformation is a global issue and the key to meeting the demand on electricity 
generation and bettering manages the supply and demand [1]. This requires embedding [2] sensors and 
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Figure 2: SCADA system. Adapted from [10] 
 
 
 
as a safety net for the serious system breaches and possible ramification on other systems. The rest of 
the paper is structured as follows: The smart grid architecture is covered in Section II. The 
vulnerabilities, threats and recent attacks are described in Section III. Section IV covers the macro and 
micro resilience strategies. Finally Section V concludes the paper. 
 
 
II.  Smart Grid and Scada Systems 
Smart grid is a system of systems interconnected through a communications network in order to 
interchange information for exercising better control on system resources. A simplified diagram is 
shown in Figure 1. It comprises of renewable power generation resources integrated into the electrical 
network. The demand management function is through the sensors, actuators and advanced metering 
infrastructure (AMI). Although a smart grid comprises of infrastructure and devices spread over a large 
geographical area, the central control is governed through the SCADA system. Data from smart meters 
and field devices such as those monitoring line voltages and current are fed into the central control 
room where the decisions are made for real time control. This real time control is based on algorithms 
controlling the generation and distribution processes. 
A SCADA system is shown in Figure 2. It comprises of field devices (sensors and actuators) that 
measure the physical quantities and actuators to respond to commands. Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) 
is used to interface with the sensors for transmitting telemetry data. Programmable Logic Controller 
(PLC) provides data acquisition and control functions which is communicated through the network to 
the SCADA server. The interface presents the data to the operator, and permits generating commands 
for the process control [10]. 
SCADA interconnection to outside network [11] makes it vulnerable as the industrial 
communication protocols over TCP/IP become susceptible to generalized and targeted cyber attacks. 
 
 
III.  Vulnerabilities, Threats and Attacks 
A. Vulnerabilities 
(1) Industrial Protocols 
The networking protocols used for industrial and wireless communications were not designed with the 
security concerns manifested in smart grids. For example, Modbus [12], a communication protocol 
used in industrial control systems has messages and responses sent in clear text. SCADA Distributed 
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Network Protocol 3.0 (DNP3) packets can also be analysed [1] through network sniffing tools to gain 
information and cause damage. 
 
(2) Privacy Issues 
Devices used in the field such as AMI increase the exposure to attacks [13]. The nature of the two-way 
flow of data raises potential privacy issues e.g. manipulation of billing information and injecting data 
into the network to degrade the system. 
 
(3) Proliferation of Networked Devices 
The connectivity of field devices through TCP/IP protocol brings many advantages but also brings 
vulnerability. The motivation of the hacker to gain access to a field device would generally be to 
penetrate deeper into the network. The biggest challenge is to protect the connected devices out in the 
field as corporate networks are generally well protected. 
 
(4) Network Analysis Tools 
Software tools like nmap [14] are freely available and can provide information about the network, 
which can be analysed further to gain more information about the network topology and exploit the 
vulnerabilities. 
 
(5) Nature of Control Systems 
The control systems’ time sensitive data and control operations can be disrupted by denial of service 
(DoS) attacks [11]. Unexpected network traffic cannot only impact operations but can also result in the 
improper or detrimental functioning of physical devices. 
 
(6) Dependence on Computing Technologies 
The SCADA systems are based on commercial operating systems (OS) and available software 
packages and thus also inherit their vulnerabilities. 
 
B. Threats 
(1) Denial of Service (DoS) 
The generation of unusually high traffic to a server can render it incapable of serving the normal 
requests and degrade its performance. This could cause delays in execution of the control by the 
system making the process unstable. 
 
(2)Man in the Middle Attack 
The interception of normal system traffic can provide an intruder with the means to generate and inject 
malicious traffic aimed at disrupting the system. Passive eavesdropping can compromise data 
confidentiality and privacy. 
 
(3)Replay Attack 
After the normal transmission has been captured [1], the same could be played at a later time which can 
offset the normal system operation. 
 
(4)Malware Attack 
The biggest threat is the malware, which could enter the system from many potential avenues. Malware 
can replicate and propagate through the system and can compromise security and privacy for a long 
time before being detected. 
 
C. Recent Attacks and Disruptions 
In the following we describe few of the recent attacks on critical infrastructures originating from 
different sources: 
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(1) Sewage System: Disgruntled Employee 
The most well-known security incident in SCADA systems is the attack on sewage control system in 
Queensland, Australia [15]. In 2000, after the installation of control system for the sewage plant, it 
experienced numerous operational problems causing flooding at nearby hotel grounds, park, and a river 
with a million liters of sewage. The problem was tracked down to acts by a disgruntled employee. 
 
(2) Generator Attack: Exploiting System Knowledge 
Based on the knowledge of commands used in the normal system operation, invalid sequences of valid 
commands can be used to destroy physical components of the smart grid [16]. In an experiment at 
Idaho National Lab in 2007, a computer program was used to rapidly open and close the circuit 
breakers of a diesel generator which eventually caused the diesel generator to explode. 
 
(3) Stuxnet: Malicious users 
A sophisticated malware program, Stuxnet [17] targeting control system software was used in 2010 to 
exploit system vulnerabilities to attack a PLC in Iran’s uranium enrichment program [11]. 
 
 
IV.  Resilience 
The intrusions and attacks cannot be eradicated by any degree of protective mechanism as the hackers 
always are on a look out to identify and exploit system vulnerabilities. However, a guarded system 
should be resilient such that compromising a portion of it does not result in a system wide collapse, and 
also that the system recovers sustaining the least downtime and damage. Effective intelligent and 
distributed control [3] enables parts of the networks to remain operational and possibly reconfigure in 
case of failures. There is a need for making the system adaptive and intelligent to make use of rule 
based logic and historical data to thwart potential breaches similar to other security aware institutions 
like financial institutions and military organizations. 
Traditional protective measures at network level, which we term as micro resilience strategies 
are not sufficient in themselves to meet the challenge, but must be applied in conjunction with more 
broader system-wide macro strategies. The proposed techniques must also be analysed and evolved 
continuously to meet the new challenges as they emerge. 
 
A. Macro Resilience Strategies 
A summary is given at Table I. This section discusses the various techniques for achieving macro resilience. 
 
(1) Design and Architecture Principles 
The system must be designed with security woven at each system tier. In [10] a novel network segmentation 
methodology is proposed for industrial processes, separating control hardware regulating input product flows 
from control hardware regulating output product flows. The proposed system comprises a graph-based 
representation of the physical process and a heuristic algorithm for generating network designs. 
 
(2) Threat Awareness 
The awareness of the potent dangers of a compromised system must be made clear to the operational staff. 
For instance, in systems, which do provide for password protection, many remain at their default values. 
(3) Last Mile Protection 
In the last mile the grid reaches the end users. The devices and networks close to user premises are 
more prone to attacks due to their exposed nature. The security measures should flow down to the 
communication end points in the field. 
The concept of last mile vs. first mile protection comes from broadband networks and emerging 
perspective of first mile where broadband infrastructure development puts the needs of the consumers 
first before the communications service providers. The distinction comes from the difference in focus 
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(business case vs. digital divide) and priority (demand vs. supply); see [18] for other aspects and for a 
review. The same can be applied to smart grids in their early development where the notion of the 
priority of securing end equipments in the field should be established. 
 
Table 1: Macro Resilience Strategies 
 
Strategy Affected Areas Policy Standar-ds Design Software/Tools Operati-ons 
Design and Architecture Principles       
Threat Awareness      
Last Mile Protection      
Micro-grid      
Generation at point of use      
Open Source Systems      
Physical security      
Principle of Least Privilege      
Risk Management and Contingency Planning      
Threat Scenarios through Simulation      
Network Attack Simulation Tools      
Data Analytics      
System Modelling      
Intrusion Detection and Prevention      
Honeypots      
 
(4) Micro Grids 
Micro grids have their own localized power generation and storage capability. They provide the facility 
where the system can be served from multiple sources [3]. In case of a major shutdown across the 
network, critical services like hospitals and law enforcement can continue to operate through the 
facilities in their micro grids. 
 
(5) Generation at Point of Use 
The need for using greener energy sources like wind and solar makes it possible for traditional 
electricity consumers like home and small business owners to generate their own electricity and feed 
the surplus to the national grid. Tesla [19] has announced batteries for powering homes and with 
further advances in storage technologies, small consumers will be able to store electricity generated by 
them. This also enables users to continue with their normal usage in case of a blackout. 
 
(6) Open Source Systems 
The vulnerabilities of open systems can be relatively easily fixed due to the support of a large support 
community. This may seem counter-intuitive but consider how the potential security loopholes in 
proprietary systems can remain undetected even when exploited. Closed systems are also difficult to 
fix after the threat surfaces [20]. 
 
(7) Physical Security 
The infrastructure may be target of a physical attack [3]. Additionally, network devices like switches 
and routers must be physically secured to limit access to critical entry points into the system. For 
wireless devices the intruder has to be in the vicinity to intercept and exploit the communication 
channel [2]. Autonomous video monitoring systems and access control can go a long way to deter the 
potential assailants. 
 
(8) Principle of Least Privilege 
The minimum access should be granted to a user group for achieving its interaction with the system. In 
[13] a technique, which covers the information accessible by a privilege class and models the flow of 
information to that class, is studied. 
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(9) Risk Management and Contingency Planning 
The system should have detailed policies for what-if scenarios to enable a faster recovery cost 
shutdown. However, for a complex system like smart grid there could be a lot of contingencies to 
handle [1]. Tool such as machine learning and modeling approaches can help identify those 
contingencies and describe them in an easily accessible graphical format [13]. 
 
(10) Threat Scenarios through Simulation 
The simulation models of the operational system can be used to check the vulnerabilities of the system 
and to fix them. A prototype for simulating computer network attacks is presented in [21] which can 
simulate large networks (thousands of hosts) realistically from attacker’s point of view. The simulator 
is based on a model of computer intrusions, derived from the analysis of real world attacks [21]. A 
simulation study for the AMI infrastructure is provided in [13]. 
 
(11) Network Attack Simulation Tools 
Snort [22] is a free tool available for intrusion detection and prevention. It could also be used to 
analyze traffic in real time, perform packet logging, protocol analysis and much more. It can detect a 
wide variety of attacks, like buffer overflows, and port scans etc. Another tool for host-based intrusion 
detection is OSSEC [23]. Network Attacks (NETA) [24] is based on OMNet++ and provides a 
framework for simulating attacks in heterogeneous networks. 
 
(12) Data Analytics 
The large data generated [25] in a smart system can be used to extract information through data 
analytics for effective management. The machine learning techniques investigated in [26] can be very 
helpful for implementing such a strategy. 
 
(13) System Modelling 
The structural vulnerabilities have been studied through complex network theory [27]. Randomized 
time delay countermeasures, as in [28], for smart meter remote connection or disconnection (RCD) 
attacks are proposed and their effectiveness demonstrated under different attack scenarios. 
 
Table 2: Micro Resilience Strategies 
 
Strategy Affected Areas Policy Standards Design Software/Tools Operations 
Vulnerability Assessment and Scanning       
Cryptography       
Firewalls       
VPNs      
Authorization and Accounting      
 
Linear dynamical models, in [29], are used to model the behavior of control systems. A model for a 
web robot network (botnet) is proposed, in [30], which can be used to attack the system in different 
ways. The resiliency of the communication architecture under cyber attack is simulated in [19] for 
metering, and demand response. 
 
(14) Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) work on rule based 
logic [29] to detect and prevent attacks against the system by recognizing abnormal events. Rule-based 
IDS for IEC 60870-5-104 protocol for SCADA networks is proposed using protocol analysis and a 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) [31]. Time-bounds checking techniques are proposed to detect intrusions 
in cyber-physical control systems [32]. A semi-supervised anomaly detection model is proposed in 
[11]. The lack of adequate intrusion detection and their limitations for the smart grid are discussed in 
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[33]. Domain-specific anomaly detection algorithms are needed which can classify both measurements 
and commands as valid/anomalous, as investigated in [34]. 
 
(15) Honeypots 
A honeypot consists of a computer, data, or a network site that is actually isolated and monitored, but 
appears exposed as a resource of value to attackers. It can be used to detect, and counteract attempts of 
unauthorized use [35]. The actual system remains hidden and protected. 
 
B. Micro Resilience Techniques 
All the conventional approaches to providing the network and communications infrastructure are still 
relevant but the safeguards now must be placed more stringently and be widely deployed. This section 
discusses the various techniques and tools that facilitate for achieving micro resilience. 
 
(1) Vulnerability Assessment and Scanning 
New vulnerabilities affect computer systems and present security challenges and unknown system 
impact [13]. The vulnerability assessment of the system through some agency other than the 
implementers can help determine and uncover the weaknesses in the system. Scanning for open ports 
can also help isolate and overcome potential problems. 
 
(2) Cryptography 
The cryptographic algorithms can make it infeasible for an intruder to decipher the information and 
deny the opportunity to inject malicious traffic [2]. Cryptography and key management techniques can 
offer some protection [36]. 
 
(3) Firewalls 
The standard practices are helpful to segregate the corporate network from malicious traffic. Firewalls can 
provide an effective protection layer for connected embedded computers such as smart grid devices [37]. 
 
(4) Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
VPNs can allow secure access to the networked corporate resources over geographically separate 
locations ensuring the implementation of the network management policies. 
 
(5) Authorization and Accounting 
The Access control lists (ACL) can be used to filter unwanted traffic in a network based on IP headers 
in the source or destination packet. The intrusion attempts or anomalous traffic can be easily 
discovered if all the user and system activity is being logged and analyzed at various tiers. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The integration of computing and communications technologies to make the electricity infrastructure 
smart provides benefits to all the stakeholders, that is, consumers, distributors and generation 
companies. However, it makes the grid vulnerable to cyber attacks by exposing a large attack surface 
to hackers through diverse system entry points, potentially compromising the whole system. The smart 
grid attacks can render the infrastructure inoperable with consequences for public security and safety. 
The cyber security challenges cannot be met through only considering a conventional network 
view as the security mandates protecting not only the corporate network but also the widespread 
system nodes. A holistic approach to tackling the challenges through a mix of resilience techniques at 
the micro and micro level is proposed which can help to identify, isolate, contain and overcome the 
cyber security challenges. It is an ongoing process rather than a one-shot operation, and must 
continually evolve to meet the new challenges as they surface. 
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